Camino Mortera-Martinez and Christian Odendahl discuss the politics and economics that underlie the different views of free movement in Britain and Europe, and asses how these differences will impact on Brexit negotiations.
You can read more on this topic in their recent policy brief.
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska speaks to TOK FM about the Scottish referendum on independence.
On Wednesday, the European Commission presented its ‘White Paper on the future of Europe’, ahead of the Treaty of Rome’s 60th anniversary celebrations on March 25th. The paper is surprisingly short and clear. It praises the virtues of the EU before discussing the challenges ahead, from aging populations to security threats. The document sets out five scenarios for the EU in 2025, ranging from ‘business as usual’ to an ‘all-mighty European Union’ (though the paper uses different terminology), and covers everything from the single market to defence and migration.
The Commission does not mention the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU, but the impact Brexit has had on this exercise is evident: the Commission has realised that if it wants the EU to survive, it needs to listen to what national governments (and their citizens) have to say about the future of Europe. But old habits die hard and the paper is sprinkled with grand references to ‘dreams’, ‘founding fathers’ and ‘vows’. This does little to connect with ordinary citizens’ concerns, at a time when their trust in the EU is decreasing. Even the beautifully constructed sentence “our darkest days are still far brighter than any spent by our forefathers imprisoned in Ventotene” is a reference to a prison that many in Europe are too young, or too geographically removed, to have even heard of. At times, the White Paper looks like an ode to a Europe that resonates with the post-World War 2 generation in Europe, not with the children of the post-Cold War era.
Divisions inside the EU will make it difficult to implement any of the Commission’s five scenarios. The EU cannot carry on as before (scenario 1), since it is already losing popular support. The second scenario (dubbed “nothing but the single market”, an option the UK would have probably supported), is anathema to the most integrationist member-states (including Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain). France and Germany’s preferred option (and that of many in Brussels, inside and outside the EU institutions) is a ‘multi-speed Europe’ (scenario 3) — a European Union where a core group pushes forward with integration in areas like defence, security or taxation, while others remain outside. But some Eastern European countries have already said this is a non-starter for them. Scenario 4 (“doing less more efficiently”) sounds good on paper but has the non-trivial difficulty of deciding what is ‘less’ and what is ‘more efficiently’ (the Commission’s choice of policies where the EU produces less added value seems rather bizarre: it includes regional development and health and safety standards, both necessary if living and working standards across the EU are to converge). Scenario 5 (“doing much more together”) is completely out of tune with current political trends in member-states.
The reality is that, unable to agree on anything more radical, the EU will probably keep muddling through with some deepening of the single market, some multi-speed Europe, a little more efficiency and a lot of continuity.
Camino Mortera-Martinez is a research fellow at the Cente for European Reform.
On Wednesday, the European Commission presented its ‘White Paper on the future of Europe’, ahead of the Treaty of Rome’s 60th anniversary celebrations on March 25th. The paper is surprisingly short and clear. It praises the virtues of the EU before discussing the challenges ahead, from aging populations to security threats. The document sets out five scenarios for the EU in 2025, ranging from ‘business as usual’ to an ‘all-mighty European Union’ (though the paper uses different terminology), and covers everything from the single market to defence and migration.
The Commission does not mention the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU, but the impact Brexit has had on this exercise is evident: the Commission has realised that if it wants the EU to survive, it needs to listen to what national governments (and their citizens) have to say about the future of Europe. But old habits die hard and the paper is sprinkled with grand references to ‘dreams’, ‘founding fathers’ and ‘vows’. This does little to connect with ordinary citizens’ concerns, at a time when their trust in the EU is decreasing. Even the beautifully constructed sentence “our darkest days are still far brighter than any spent by our forefathers imprisoned in Ventotene” is a reference to a prison that many in Europe are too young, or too geographically removed, to have even heard of. At times, the White Paper looks like an ode to a Europe that resonates with the post-World War 2 generation in Europe, not with the children of the post-Cold War era.
Divisions inside the EU will make it difficult to implement any of the Commission’s five scenarios. The EU cannot carry on as before (scenario 1), since it is already losing popular support. The second scenario (dubbed “nothing but the single market”, an option the UK would have probably supported), is anathema to the most integrationist member-states (including Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain). France and Germany’s preferred option (and that of many in Brussels, inside and outside the EU institutions) is a ‘multi-speed Europe’ (scenario 3) — a European Union where a core group pushes forward with integration in areas like defence, security or taxation, while others remain outside. But some Eastern European countries have already said this is a non-starter for them. Scenario 4 (“doing less more efficiently”) sounds good on paper but has the non-trivial difficulty of deciding what is ‘less’ and what is ‘more efficiently’ (the Commission’s choice of policies where the EU produces less added value seems rather bizarre: it includes regional development and health and safety standards, both necessary if living and working standards across the EU are to converge). Scenario 5 (“doing much more together”) is completely out of tune with current political trends in member-states.
The reality is that, unable to agree on anything more radical, the EU will probably keep muddling through with some deepening of the single market, some multi-speed Europe, a little more efficiency and a lot of continuity.
Camino Mortera-Martinez is a research fellow and Brussels representative at the Cente for European Reform.
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska speaks to TOK FM about the mini- summit in Versailles and a multi-speed EU.
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska speaks to Radio 5 Live about how Europeans view Brexit (from 08.00-25.00 mins).
Charles Grant speaks to Good Morning Scotland about the governments Brexit negotiations and the UK's hopes for trade deals (from 01.20).
Charles Grant talks to The World Tonight about what could lie in store should Britain leave the EU without an exit deal (from 30.25).
Charles Grant speaks to Richard Quest on CNN to discuss the Dutch election result.
Mark Rutte, the incumbent Dutch prime minister, celebrated winning the largest share of seats in yesterday’s parliamentary elections by declaring that the Netherlands has put a stop to the rise of the “wrong kind of populism”. But has it?
Most of Europe breathed a sigh of relief when it became clear that Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party (PVV) would not come first. German chancellor Angela Merkel was quick to congratulate Rutte and said she looked forward to continuing to work with him. It was long clear that if Wilders had gained the largest share of seats, he would most likely stay out of government; during the campaign, every mainstream party had ruled out joining him in a coalition. But symbolically and psychologically, this result is significant and gives a confidence boost to moderates in France and Germany, where Eurosceptic parties look set to do well in elections later this year.
Eurosceptic parties will not govern, but the Dutch political landscape is more fragmented than it has ever been. The Dutch should avoid being complacent. Thirteen parties will take seats in the new parliament. Forging coalitions, and maintaining them, will be a challenge. It is not hard to see who would gain from any political turbulence.
Neither should Rutte overestimate his success. The government, made up of Rutte’s VVD party and the social democrats (PvdA), lost 37 of its 79 seats. The pain was distributed unevenly: the PvdA dramatically lost three-quarters of its seats, Rutte saw his 41 seats reduced by eight. But Wilders won seats, if only five.
Though his gains were less than expected, Wilders now represents the second-largest faction in parliament. If, as expected, he is not invited to join a coalition, he will lead the largest party in opposition, giving him a platform to hold the new government to account and exploit any missteps it makes.
Wilders will continue to set the tone of the Dutch political debate. This election cycle revolved around issues that he had put on the agenda; migration, Islam, national identity, the European Union and inequality. These issues will not go away. Rutte and the Christian Democrats — which will probably join forces in government — were able to peel voters away from the PVV by adopting a Wilders-like tone on migration, Islam or the EU, and package it in a way voters found more palatable. It remains to be seen whether this electoral rhetoric will translate into government policy, but Rutte and others won by lurching right. On the fringes, a new Eurosceptic, anti-establishment party called Forum for Democracy managed to win seats by copying much of the PVV agenda.
History is shaped by the victors, and so the VVD will say they blocked the ascent of Wilders. But among yesterday’s winners, there were eurosceptic parties and anti-establishment ones. That they will not end up in government is a small comfort. The populist swell remains strong, it just has not breached the dykes. The new coalition government has a responsibility to strengthen them.
Rem Korteweg is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.
Mark Rutte, the incumbent Dutch prime minister, celebrated winning the largest share of seats in yesterday’s parliamentary elections by declaring that the Netherlands has put a stop to the rise of the “wrong kind of populism”. But has it?
Most of Europe breathed a sigh of relief when it became clear that Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party (PVV) would not come first. German chancellor Angela Merkel was quick to congratulate Rutte and said she looked forward to continuing to work with him. It was long clear that if Wilders had gained the largest share of seats, he would most likely stay out of government; during the campaign, every mainstream party had ruled out joining him in a coalition. But symbolically and psychologically, this result is significant and gives a confidence boost to moderates in France and Germany, where Eurosceptic parties look set to do well in elections later this year.
Eurosceptic parties will not govern, but the Dutch political landscape is more fragmented than it has ever been. The Dutch should avoid being complacent. Thirteen parties will take seats in the new parliament. Forging coalitions, and maintaining them, will be a challenge. It is not hard to see who would gain from any political turbulence.
Neither should Rutte overestimate his success. The government, made up of Rutte’s VVD party and the social democrats (PvdA), lost 37 of its 79 seats. The pain was distributed unevenly: the PvdA dramatically lost three-quarters of its seats, Rutte saw his 41 seats reduced by eight. But Wilders won seats, if only five.
Though his gains were less than expected, Wilders now represents the second-largest faction in parliament. If, as expected, he is not invited to join a coalition, he will lead the largest party in opposition, giving him a platform to hold the new government to account and exploit any missteps it makes.
Wilders will continue to set the tone of the Dutch political debate. This election cycle revolved around issues that he had put on the agenda; migration, Islam, national identity, the European Union and inequality. These issues will not go away. Rutte and the Christian Democrats — which will probably join forces in government — were able to peel voters away from the PVV by adopting a Wilders-like tone on migration, Islam or the EU, and package it in a way voters found more palatable. It remains to be seen whether this electoral rhetoric will translate into government policy, but Rutte and others won by lurching right. On the fringes, a new Eurosceptic, anti-establishment party called Forum for Democracy managed to win seats by copying much of the PVV agenda.
History is shaped by the victors, and so the VVD will say they blocked the ascent of Wilders. But among yesterday’s winners, there were eurosceptic parties and anti-establishment ones. That they will not end up in government is a small comfort. The populist swell remains strong, it just has not breached the dykes. The new coalition government has a responsibility to strengthen them.
Rem Korteweg is a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform.
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska talks to TVN24 BiS about what Brexit will mean for immigrants in Britain and for British people themselves.
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska speaks to TOK FM about the impending Brexit talks and what is to come over the next few months.
blurb here
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska, a research fellow at the CER said:
“Quote”
Camino Mortera-Martinez, a research fellow at the CER said:
“Quote”
Get in touch with CER experts
To talk to our experts or book them for TV and radio programmes please contact us via pressoffice@cer.org.uk or call us on +44 (0) 207 233 1199.
CER researchers are fluent in most European languages, including English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Dutch, Ukrainian and Russian. Our offices are centrally located in Westminster, close to College Green.
Charles Grant
Director
Areas of expertise: Britain & the EU, EU institutions
Twitter @CER_Grant
Ian Bond
Director of foreign policy
Areas of expertise: EU foreign policy, Russia relations, US foreign policy
Twitter @CER_IanBond
Rem Korteweg
Senior research fellow
Areas of expertise: EU foreign policy, trade policy, transatlantic security
Twitter @CER_Korteweg
John Springford
Director of research
Areas of expertise: Trade, the euro, fiscal & monetary policy
Twitter @JohnSpringford
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska
Research fellow
Areas of expertise: EU institutions, Polish European policy
Twitter @AgataGostynska
Camino Mortera-Martinez
Research fellow & Brussels representative
Areas of expertise: Schengen & free movement, JHA & counter-terrorism
Twitter @CaminoMortera
Sophia Besch
Research fellow
Areas of expertise: NATO, European defence, German foreign policy
Twitter @SophiaBesch
blurb here
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska, a research fellow at the CER said:
“Quote”
Camino Mortera-Martinez, a research fellow at the CER said:
“Quote”
Get in touch with CER experts
To talk to our experts or book them for TV and radio programmes please contact us via pressoffice@cer.org.uk or call us on +44 (0) 207 233 1199.
CER researchers are fluent in most European languages, including English, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Polish, Dutch, Ukrainian and Russian. Our offices are centrally located in Westminster, close to College Green.
Simon Tilford
Deputy director
Areas of expertise: Britain and Europe, the euro, fiscal and monetary policy, labour and social policy.
Twitter @SimonTilford
Ian Bond
Director of foreign policy
Areas of expertise: EU foreign policy, Russia relations, US foreign policy
Twitter @CER_IanBond
Rem Korteweg
Senior research fellow
Areas of expertise: EU foreign policy, trade policy, transatlantic security
Twitter @CER_Korteweg
John Springford
Director of research
Areas of expertise: Trade, the euro, fiscal & monetary policy
Twitter @JohnSpringford
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska
Research fellow
Areas of expertise: EU institutions, Polish European policy
Twitter @AgataGostynska
Camino Mortera-Martinez
Research fellow & Brussels representative
Areas of expertise: Schengen & free movement, JHA & counter-terrorism
Twitter @CaminoMortera
Charles Grant talks to China Central Television about the fall in the value of the pound since the referendum and the impact on food prices (from 01.30).
In the last few weeks, leading Conservative Brexiters have been talking up the possibility of walking away with no deal. Theresa May herself said that “no deal is better than a bad deal.” This is not true, and it is good that Theresa May’s letter to Donald Tusk struck a more constructive tone, praising the EU’s achievements. Leaving the EU with no deal would mean tariffs on trade; legal chaos, with every British company selling to the EU unsure if they are doing so legally; and Britain’s alliances with other European countries in ruins.
But there is a decent chance that this outcome, not desired by anyone with a passing understanding of modern trade, comes to pass. The process for leaving the EU is simple, but hands power to the EU-27. Article 50 matters in two ways. First, the agreement only need cover the withdrawal arrangements — it simply needs to ‘take account’ of the future relationship, if any. Second, if no deal is struck in two years, the member-state departs — unless all 28 countries agree to extend the talks.
The article was written to make it possible to eject a state that turned authoritarian, according to John Kerr, its author (and chairman of CER). But applied to Brexit it is a recipe for brinksmanship. The EU-27 know that Britain will feel the costs of a failure to strike a deal more than they will. The 27 have some specific things that they all want — the rights of their citizens who live in the UK to be secured, and the UK to pay for its EU commitments to the EU budget. So they have an interest in sticking together to ensure that these issues are sorted out first (with the UK agreeing to respect migrants’ rights and pay up). Only once that is agreed, the EU-27 say, will they move onto negotiating any transition arrangements and the future relationship. We can expect the EU-27 to suspend talks if the UK refuses to meet its terms. The first test of the negotiations for Theresa May — in fact, of her premiership — will be whether she can face down the radicals in her own party.
We do not know what the EU-27 will demand in return for agreeing to a transition deal. Such a deal is needed to prevent tariffs, customs controls and legal uncertainty before the ratification of a free trade agreement. The 27 have little interest in setting up new rules and institutions for the UK’s transition. The 27 may demand that the UK de facto remain in the single market or customs union, with EU law still in force, and free movement continuing, or for Britain to leave and apply for a free trade agreement from the outside.
Meanwhile, the “bold and ambitious” free trade agreement that Theresa May called for in her letter, including financial services, data and telecoms, is not far in scope from the current single market; yet May has made an end to free movement and the European Court of Justice’s supremacy her red lines. She will have to risk defenstration by the right if she is to deliver such a deal, since the price the 27 will demand for it will be high. No deal is still a big risk, despite May’s warmer tones now that the negotiations are about to begin.
John Springford is director of research at the Centre for European Reform.
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska talks to Sophia Besch about the triggering of Article 50, the tone and substance of the letter, how it was received in Brussels, and how we can expect negotiations to unfold.
Rem Korteweg talks to Nieuwsuur about the triggering of Article 50 and the forthcoming negotiations (from 20.51).
